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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3566 
___________ 
 
HARBHINDER SINGH, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
     Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A201-297-300) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Steven A. Morley 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 24, 2015 
 
Before:  AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 24, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se petitioner Harbhinder Singh has filed a petition for review challenging a 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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final order of removal.  For the reasons detailed below, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
 Singh is a citizen of India.  He entered the United States in 2011, and was almost 
immediately apprehended by agents of the Department of Homeland Security and 
charged with being removable as an alien present in the United States without admission 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  Singh conceded removability but applied for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).   
 Singh testified before an Immigration Judge (IJ) in support of his claims.  He 
stated that he resided in the state of Punjab and a village near Gurdaspur, and that he was 
a member of the Shiromani Akali Dal political party.  This party seeks to establish an 
independent Sikh country called Khalistan.  Singh alleged that, due to his membership in 
this party, he was attacked on two occasions by members of the rival Congress party.  
First, on December 14, 2010, while attending a party rally, about 50 members of the 
Congress party attacked him and other members of Shiromani Akali Dal; Singh testified 
that he was beaten until he lost consciousness and that he needed stitches in his hand.  
Second, on March 31, 2011, members of the Congress party invaded his home, which he 
shared with his wife, child, mother, and father.  Again, he was beaten, and suffered 
damage to his shoulder.  Singh produced doctor’s reports documenting these two injuries, 
as well as statements from his father and a village leader (called a sarpanch). 
 The IJ denied all relief to Singh.  First, the IJ concluded that Singh failed to 
present credible testimony, due to discrepancies between Singh’s testimony and the 
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documentary evidence, including his prior statement, the statements provided by his 
father and the sarpanch, and the country-conditions evidence.  Second, the IJ ruled that 
Singh had failed adequately to corroborate his claims.  Finally, the IJ concluded that 
Singh had simply failed to sustain his burdens of proof.  Singh appealed to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal.  The BIA agreed with the IJ’s 
credibility and corroboration determinations, and likewise concluded that Singh had 
failed to show that he was entitled to relief on his CAT claim.  Singh then filed a timely 
petition for review to this Court.   
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review final orders of removal.  
Because “the BIA has based its decision on the IJ’s adverse credibility analysis, we may 
review both the BIA’s opinion and the IJ’s opinion.”  Myat Thu v. Att’y Gen., 510 F.3d 
405, 412 (3d Cir. 2007).  We review the agency’s factual findings — which include the 
credibility determination, see Kaita v. Att’y Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 2008), and 
the assessment of what is likely to happen to Singh if he is removed, see Kaplun v. Att’y 
Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010) — under the substantial-evidence standard.  We 
must uphold these findings “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 
conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 
 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s credibility determination.  As the BIA 
observed, there were a number of inconsistencies between the Singh’s testimony and the 
record evidence.  First, Singh testified that, on the day after the home invasion, he met 
with the sarpanch and discussed the incident.  Meanwhile, in his statement, the sarpanch 
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reported that by the time he arrived, Singh had already fled.  Similarly, Singh’s father 
attributed the invasion to “some un-identified persons,” while Singh testified that he and 
his family recognized the attackers (by name and face) and knew that they were affiliated 
with the Congress party.  Further, in his statement, Singh said that he and his father were 
the only victims of the home invasion, while he testified that his mother and wife were 
also attacked.  It was reasonable for the BIA to base an adverse credibility determination 
on these discrepancies.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (providing that credibility 
determinations may be based on, among other things, “the consistency of such statements 
with other evidence of record”); Xin Jie Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 
2004) (later embellishment of claim may support adverse credibility finding).  Moreover, 
while Singh tried to explain these inconsistencies — he stated, respectively, that the 
sarpanch must have meant that Singh had subsequently left, that he did not believe that 
the attacks on his mother and wife were relevant, and that his father did not name the 
attackers in his letter to avoid upsetting them — the agency was not required to accept 
these explanations.  See Xie, 359 F.3d at 245-46.  Accordingly, the BIA did not err in 
denying Singh’s asylum and withholding-of-removal claims.1  See Tarrawally v. 
Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2003). 
                                              
1 In light of this conclusion, we need not reach the BIA’s alternative ruling that Singh 
failed to adequately corroborate his testimony.  See Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 247 
(3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“An alien’s credibility, by itself, may satisfy his burden, or 
doom his claim.”); see generally Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
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 Substantial evidence likewise supports the BIA’s conclusion that Singh was not 
entitled to relief under the CAT because he failed to show that it was more likely than not 
that he would be tortured at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of the 
Indian government.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).  As the BIA concluded, Singh did not 
present any objective evidence in support of his claim.  It was reasonable for the BIA to 
conclude that Singh’s testimony — which it did not find credible — and speculation 
about what he believed would happen to him in India were not sufficient, standing alone, 
to satisfy the CAT’s demanding standard.  See, e.g., Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 
218 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 Accordingly, we will deny Singh’s petition for review.2 
 
                                              
2 Singh attached to his brief a newly drafted affidavit, but we are required to “decide the 
petition only on the administrative record on which the order of removal is based.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A). 
